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The Shannon Cipher System with a Guessing
Wiretapper: General Sources
Manjesh Kumar Hanawal and Rajesh Sundaresan
Abstract
The Shannon cipher system is studied in the context of general sources using a notion of computational secrecy
introduced by Merhav & Arikan. Bounds are derived on limiting exponents of guessing moments for general sources.
The bounds are shown to be tight for iid, Markov, and unifilar sources, thus recovering some known results. A
close relationship between error exponents and correct decoding exponents for fixed rate source compression on
the one hand and exponents for guessing moments on the other hand is established.
Index Terms
cipher systems, correct decoding exponent, error exponent, information spectrum, key rate, length function,
large deviations, secrecy, sources with memory, fixed-rate source coding
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the classical cipher system of Shannon [1]. Let Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn) be a message where
each letter takes values on a finite set X. This message should be communicated securely from a transmitter
to a receiver, both of which have access to a common secure key Uk of k purely random bits independent
of Xn. The transmitter computes the cryptogram Y = fn(Xn, Uk) and sends it to the receiver over a
public channel. The cryptogram may be of variable length. The encryption function fn is invertible for
any fixed Uk. The receiver, knowing Y and Uk, computes Xn = f−1n (Y, Uk). The functions fn and f−1n
are published. A wiretapping attacker has access to the cryptogram Y , knows fn and f−1n , and attempts
to identify Xn without knowledge of Uk. The attacker can use knowledge of the statistics of Xn. We
assume that the attacker has a test mechanism that tells him whether a guess Xˆn is correct or not. For
example, the attacker may wish to attack an encrypted password or personal information to gain access to,
say, a computer account, or a bank account via internet, or a classified database [2]. In these situations,
successful entry into the system provides the natural test mechanism. We assume that the attacker is
allowed an unlimited number of guesses. The key rate for the cipher system is R = k(ln 2)/n nats1 of
secrecy per message (or source) letter.
Merhav & Arikan [2] studied discrete memoryless sources (DMS) in the above setting and characterized
the best attainable moments of the number of guesses required by an attacker. In particular, they showed
that for a DMS with the governing single letter PMF P on X, the value of the optimal exponent for the
ρth moment (ρ > 0) is given by
E(R, ρ) = max
Q
{ρmin{H(Q), R} −D(Q ‖ P )} . (1)
The maximization is over all PMFs Q on X, H(Q) is the Shannon entropy of Q, and D(Q ‖ P ) is the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between Q and P . They also showed that E(R, ρ) increases linearly in R for
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1We shall mostly use nat as the unit of information in this paper by taking natural logarithms. k(ln 2)/n nats per input symbol is the
same as k/n bits per input symbol.
2R ≤ H(P ), continues to increase in a concave fashion for R ∈ [H(P ), H ′], where H ′ is a threshold, and
is constant for R > H ′ . Unlike the classical equivocation rate analysis, atypical sequences do affect the
behavior of E(R, ρ) for R ∈ [H(P ), H ′] and perfect secrecy is obtained, i.e., cryptogram is uncorrelated
with the message, only for R > H ′ > H(P ). Merhav & Arikan also determined the best achievable
performance based on the probability of a large deviation in the number of guesses, and showed that it
equals the Legendre-Fenchel transform of E(R, ρ) as a function of ρ. Sundaresan [3] extended the above
results to unifilar sources. Hayashi & Yamamoto [4] proved coding theorems for the Shannon cipher
system with correlated outputs (Xn, Zn) where the wiretapper is interested in Xn while the receiver in
Zn.
In this paper, we extend Merhav & Arikan’s notion of computational secrecy [2] to general sources.
One motivation is that secret messages typically come from the natural languages which are modeled
well as sources with memory, for e.g., a Markov source of appropriate order. Another motivation is that
the study of general sources clearly brings out the connection between guessing and compression, as
discussed next.
As with other studies of general sources, information spectrum plays crucial role in this paper. We
show that E(R, ρ) is closely related to (a) the error exponent of a rate-R source code, and (b) the correct
decoding exponent of a rate-R source code, when exponentiated probabilities are considered (see Sec.
III-B2). In particular, the exponents in (a) and (b) appear in the first and second terms below when we
rewrite E(R, ρ) for a DMS as
E(R, ρ) = max
{
ρR− min
Q:H(Q)>R
D(Q ‖ P ),
min
Q:H(Q)≤R
{ρH(Q)−D(Q ‖ P )}
}
.
This brings out the fundamental connection between source coding exponents and key-rate constrained
guessing exponents. Further, unlike the case for the probability of a large deviation in the number of
guesses [2, Sec. V], both the error exponent and the correct decoding exponent determine E(R, ρ). We
extend the above result to general sources by getting upper and lower bounds on E(R, ρ). We then show
that these are tight for DMS, Markov and unifilar sources. The bounds may be of interest even if they
are not tight because the upper bound specifies the amount of effort need by an attacker and the lower
bound specifies the secrecy strength of the cryptosystem to a designer.
The limiting case as ρ ↓ 0 in (b) yields classical framework for probability of correct decoding. This
special case is related to the work of Han [5] and Iriyama [6] who studied the dual problem of rates
required to meet a specified error exponent or a specified correct decoding exponent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II relates our problem to a modification of Campbell’s
compression problem [7]. Section III gives bounds on the limits of exponential rate of guessing moments,
in terms of information spectrum quantities. Section IV evaluates the bounds for some specific examples.
Section V concludes the paper with additional remarks. Proofs are given in the appendices.
II. GUESSING WITH KEY-RATE CONSTRAINTS AND SOURCE COMPRESSION
In this section, we make a precise statement of our problem, and establish a connection between guessing
and source compression subject to a new cost criterion.
Let Xn denote the set of messages and M(Xn) the set of PMFs on Xn. By a source, we mean a
sequence of PMFs (Pn : n ∈ N), where2 Pn ∈ M(Xn). Let Xn denote a message put out by the source
and Uk the secure key of k purely random bits independent of Xn. Recall that the transmitter computes
the cryptogram Y = fn(Xn, Uk) and sends it to the receiver over a public channel.
2Sometimes we use PXn in place of Pn when we refer to the distribution of the random vector Xn.
3For a given cryptogram Y = y, define a guessing strategy
Gn(· | y) : X
n → {1, 2, · · · , |X|n}
as a bijection that denotes the order in which elements of Xn are guessed. Gn(xn | y) = l indicates
that xn is the lth guess, when the cryptogram is y. With knowledge of Pn, the encryption function fn,
and the cryptogram Y , the attacker can exhaustively calculate the posterior probabilities of all plaintexts
PXn|Y (· | y) given the cryptogram. The attacker’s optimal guessing strategy is then to guess in the
decreasing order of these posterior probabilities PXn|Y (· | y). Let us denote this optimal attack strategy
as Gfn . The key rate for the system is R = k(ln 2)/n nats of secrecy per source letter. Let (fn : n ∈ N)
denote the sequence of encryption functions, where N denotes the set of natural numbers. This sequence is
known to the attacker. We assume that the attacker employs the aforementioned optimal guessing strategy.
For a given ρ > 0, key rate R > 0, define the normalized guessing exponent
Egn(R, ρ) := sup
fn
1
n
lnE [Gfn(X
n | Y )ρ] .
The supremum is taken over all encryption functions. Further define performance limits of guessing
moments as in [2]:
Egu(R, ρ) := lim sup
n→∞
Egn(R, ρ) (2)
Egl (R, ρ) := lim infn→∞
Egn(R, ρ). (3)
We next define the related compression quantities. A length function Ln : Xn → N is a mapping that
satisfies Kraft’s inequality: ∑
xn∈Xn
exp2{−Ln(x
n)} ≤ 1,
where the code alphabet is taken to be binary and exp2{a} = 2a. (We shall use exp to denote the inverse of
the natural logarithm ln). Every length function yields an attack strategy with a performance characterized
as follows.
Proposition 1: Let Ln be any length function on Xn. There is a guessing list Gn such that for any
encryption function fn, we have3
Gn(x
n | y) ≤ 2 exp2 {min {Ln(x
n), nR/(ln 2)}}
= 2 exp {min {Ln(x
n) ln 2, nR}} .
Proof: We use a technique of Merhav & Arikan [2]. Let GLn denote the guessing function that
ignores the cryptogram and proceeds in the increasing order of Ln lengths. Suppose GLn proceeds in
the order xn1 , xn2 , · · · . By [8, Prop. 2], we need at most exp2{Ln(xn)} guesses to identify xn (This is a
simple consequence of the fact that there are at most exp2{Ln(xn)} strings of length less than or equal
to Ln(xn)).
As an alternative attack, consider the exhaustive key-search attack defined by the following guessing list:
f−1n
(
y, uk1
)
, f−1n
(
y, uk2
)
, · · ·
where uk1, uk2, · · · is an arbitrary ordering of the keys. This strategy identifies xn in at most exp{nR} =
exp2{nR/(ln 2)} guesses. Finally, let Gn(· | y) be the list that alternates between the two lists, skipping
those already guessed, i.e., the one that proceeds in the order
xn1 , f
−1
n
(
y, uk1
)
, xn2 , f
−1
n
(
y, uk2
)
, · · · . (4)
Clearly, for every xn, we need at most twice the minimum over the two individual lists.
3We reiterate that R is measured in nats.
4We now look at a weak converse in the expected sense to the above. We first state without proof the
following lemma which associates a length function to any guessing function (see [8, Prop. 1]).
Lemma 2: Given a guessing function Gn, there exists a length function LGn satisfying
LGn(x
n)− 1− log2 cn ≤ log2Gn(x
n) ≤ LGn(x
n), (5)
where
cn =
|X|n∑
i=1
1
i
.
For a proof, we refer the reader to [8, Prop. 1]. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Fix n ∈ N, ρ > 0. There is an encryption function fn and a length function Ln such
that every guessing strategy Gn (and in particular Gfn) satisfies
E [G(Xn | Y )ρ]
≥
1
(2cn)ρ(2 + ρ)
E [exp {ρmin {Ln (X
n) ln 2, nR}}] .
Proof: See Appendix A. The proof is an extension of Merhav & Arikan’s proof of [2, Th.1] to
sources with memory. The idea is to identify an encryption mechanism that maps messages of roughly
equal probability to each other. Our proof also suggests an asymptotically optimal encryption strategy for
sources with memory.
Remark 1: Note that cn ≤ 1 + n ln |X|, so that
log2 cn
n
= O
(
log2 n
n
)
= o(1), (6)
a fact that will be put to good use in the sequel.
Propositions 1 and 3 naturally suggest the following coding problem: identify
Esn(R, ρ) := min
Ln
1
n
lnE [exp {ρmin {Ln(X
n) ln 2, nR}}] . (7)
The minimum is taken over all length functions. We may interpret the cost of using length Ln(xn) as
exp {min{Ln(x
n) ln 2, nR}}, i.e., the cost is exponential in Ln, but saturates at exp{nR} and so all
lengths larger than nR nats (i.e., nR/(ln 2) bits) enjoy the saturated cost. Then Esn(R, ρ) is the minimum
normalized exponent of the ρth moment of this new compression cost. In analogy with (2) and (3) we
define
Esu(R, ρ) = lim sup
n→∞
Esn(R, ρ)
Esl (R, ρ) = lim inf
n→∞
Esn(R, ρ)
The following is a corollary to Propositions 1 and 3, and relates Egn(R, ρ) and Esn(R, ρ).
Corollary 4: For a given R, ρ > 0, we have
|Esn(R, ρ)−E
g
n(R, ρ)| ≤
ln((4cn)
ρ(2 + ρ))
n
. (8)
5Proof: Let L∗n be the length function that achieves Esn(R, ρ). Using Proposition 1, and after taking
expectation, we have the guessing strategy Gn that satisfies
E [exp {ρmin {L∗n(X
n) ln 2, nR}}]
≥ sup
fn
1
2ρ
E [Gn(X
n | Y )ρ]
≥ sup
fn
1
2ρ
E [Gfn(X
n | Y )ρ]
≥
1
(4cn)ρ(2 + ρ)
E [exp {ρmin {Ln(X
n) ln 2, nR}}]
for some fn and Ln, given by Proposition 3,
≥
1
(4cn)ρ(2 + ρ)
E [exp {ρmin {L∗n(X
n) ln 2, nR}}] .
Take logarithms, normalize by n, use cn > 1 and ρ > 0 to get (8).
We now state the equivalence between compression and guessing.
Theorem 5 (Guessing-Compression Equivalence): For any ρ > 0 and R > 0, we have Esu(R, ρ) =
Egu(R, ρ) and Esl (R, ρ) = E
g
l (R, ρ).
Proof: From Corollary 4 and (6), magnitude of the difference between Egn(R, ρ) and Esn(R, ρ) decays
as O((lnn)/n) and vanishes as n→∞.
Thus, the problem of finding the optimal guessing exponent is the same as that of finding the optimal
exponent for the coding problem in (7). When R ≥ ln |X|, the coding problem in (7) reduces to the
one considered by Campbell in [7]; this is a case where perfect secrecy is obtained and is studied in [8].
Proposition 1 shows that the optimal length function attaining the minimum in (7) yields an asymptotically
optimal attack strategy on the cipher system. Moreover, the encryption strategy in the proof of Proposition
3 (see Appendix A) is asymptotically optimal, from the designer’s point of view.
In the rest of the paper we focus on the equivalent compression problem and find bounds on Esu and
Esl .
III. GROWTH EXPONENT FOR THE MODIFIED COMPRESSION PROBLEM
We begin with some words on notation. Recall that M(Xn) denotes the set of PMFs on Xn. The
Shannon entropy for a Pn ∈ M(Xn) is
H(Pn) = −
∑
xn∈Xn
Pn(x
n) lnPn(x
n)
and the Re´nyi entropy of order α 6= 1 is
Hα(Pn) =
1
1− α
ln
( ∑
xn∈Xn
Pn(x
n)α
)
. (9)
The Kullback-Leibler divergence or relative entropy between two PMFs Qn and Pn is
D(Qn ‖ Pn) =


∑
xn∈Xn
Qn(x
n) ln
Qn(x
n)
Pn(xn)
, if Qn ≪ Pn,
∞, otherwise,
where Qn ≪ Pn means Qn is absolutely continuous with respect to Pn. We shall use (Xn : n ∈ N)
to denote a sequence of random variables on Xn, with corresponding sequence of probability measures
denoted by X := (PXn : n ∈ N). Thus X is a source and Xn its n-letter message output. Abusing notation,
6we let M(XN) denote the set of all sequences Y = (PY n : n ∈ N) of probability measures, and for each
B := (Bn ⊆ X
n : n ∈ N), we define
M(B) :=
{
Y ∈M(X) : lim
n→∞
PY n(Bn) = 1
}
.
In the rest of this section X is a fixed source. For any Y ∈ M(B) and ρ > 0, define
Eu(Y,X, ρ) := lim sup
n→∞
1
n
{ρH(PY n)−D(PY n ‖ PXn)}
and
El(Y,X, ρ) := lim inf
n→∞
1
n
{ρH(PY n)−D(PY n ‖ PXn)}.
We next state a large deviation result that plays a key role in the derivation of bounds on Esu and Esl .
Proposition 6: For all ρ ≥ 0 and B = (Bn ⊆ Xn : n ∈ N), we have
(1 + ρ) lim sup
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈Bn
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n) = max
Y∈M(B)
Eu(Y,X, ρ) (10)
(1 + ρ) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈Bn
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n) = max
Y∈M(B)
El(Y,X, ρ) (11)
The maximum-achieving distribution in (10) and (11) is the source X∗ = (P ∗Xn : n ∈ N) given by
P ∗Xn(·) =
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (·)∑
yn∈Bn
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (y
n)
. (12)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2: This proposition is a generalization of Iriyama’s [6, Prop. 1], which is obtained by setting
ρ = 0.
A. Upper Bound on Esu
We first obtain an upper bound on Esu. We use EXn [·] to denote the expectation with respect to
distribution PXn .
Proposition 7 (Upper Bound): Let R > 0 and ρ > 0. Then
Esu(R, ρ) ≤ min
0≤θ≤ρ
[
(ρ− θ)R + max
Y∈M(XN)
Eu(Y,X, θ)
]
.
Proof: We first recall the useful variational formula [9, Prop. 1.4.2]
lnEXn [exp{U(X
n)}]
= sup
PY n
{EY n [U(Y
n)]−D(PY n ‖ PXn)} (13)
7for any U : Xn → R, where R denotes set of real numbers. For notational convenience, let d(Y n) :=
D(PY n ‖ PXn). Observe that
lnEXn [exp {ρmin{Ln(X
n) ln 2, nR}}]
= sup
PY n
[ρEY n [min{Ln(Y
n) ln 2, nR}]− d(Y n)] (14)
≤ sup
PY n
[ρmin{EY n [Ln(Y
n) ln 2] , nR} − d(Y n)] (15)
= sup
PY n
{
min
0≤θ≤ρ
[(ρ− θ)nR + θEY n [Ln(Y
n) ln 2]
− d(Y n)
}
(16)
= min
0≤θ≤ρ
sup
PY n
{
(ρ− θ)nR + θEY n [Ln(Y
n) ln 2]
− d(Y n)
}
(17)
= min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)nR + sup
PY n
{
θEY n [Ln(Y
n) ln 2]
− d(Y n)
}}
.
In the above sequence of inequalities, (14) follows from the variational formula (13) with
U(xn) = ρmin{Ln(x
n) ln 2, nR}.
Inequality (15) follows from Jensen’s inequality because min{·, nR} is concave for a fixed nR. Equality
(16) follows from the identity
ρmin{a, b} = min
0≤θ≤ρ
{θa + (ρ− θ)b}.
Equality (17) follows because the term within braces is linear in θ for a fixed PY n , concave in PY n for a
fixed θ, and the sets [0, ρ] and M(Xn) are compact and convex; these permit an interchange of sup and
inf, thanks to a minmax theorem [10, Cor. 2, p. 53]. Taking inf over Ln, and interchanging the inf over
Ln and the min over θ, we get
inf
Ln
lnEXn [exp {ρmin{Ln(Y
n) ln 2, nR}}]
≤ min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)nR + inf
Ln
sup
PY n
{
θEY n [Ln(Y
n) ln 2]
− d(Y n)
}}
= min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)nR + sup
PY n
{
θ inf
Ln
EY n [Ln(Y
n) ln 2]
− d(Y n)
}
+O(1)
}
(18)
= min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)nR + sup
PY n
{
θH(PY n)
− d(Y n)
}
+O(1)
}
(19)
= min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)nR + θH 1
1+θ
(PXn) +O(1)
}
. (20)
8Equality (18) follows because the function inside the inner braces is concave in PY n , asymptotically
linear in Ln (see proof of [8, Prop. 6]), and M(Xn) is compact; this allows us to interchange inf and
sup. Inequality (19) follows because inf of expected compression lengths over all prefix codes is within
ln 2 nats (1 bit) of entropy. The last equality follows from the well-known variational characterization of
Re´nyi entropy,
sup
PY n
{θH(PY n)−D(PY n ‖ PXn)} = θH 1
1+θ
(PXn), (21)
a fact that can also be gleaned from the variational formula (13). Divide both sides of (20) by n and take
limit supremum as n→∞ to get
Esu(R, ρ)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)R +
θ
n
H 1
1+θ
(PXn)
}
≤ min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)R + θ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H 1
1+θ
(PXn)
}
= min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)R + max
Y∈M(XN)
Eu(Y,X, θ)
}
,
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 6 and the formula for Re´nyi entropy. This completes
the proof.
From the above proof it is clear that the upper bound holds with equality, when Jensen’s inequality
holds with equality in (15), i.e, the random variable (1/n)min{Ln(Xn) ln 2, nR} tends asymptotically to
a constant. This would happen, for example, when normalized encoded lengths concentrate around the
entropy rate of the source.
B. Lower Bound on Esl
We now derive a lower bound on Esl . For a given distribution PY n arrange the elements of set Xn in the
decreasing order of their PY n-probabilities as done in Sundaresan [3, Sec. IV]. Enumerate the sequences
from 1 to |X|n. Henceforth refer to a message by its index. Let TR(Y n) denote the first M = ⌊exp{nR}⌋
elements in the list. We denote the probability of this set by FY n , i.e.,
FY n =
∑
xn∈TR(Y n)
PY n(x
n),
and the probability of the complement of this set T cR(Y n) by F cY n . Let the restriction of PY n to this set
TR(Y
n) be P ′Y n . Let L∗n denote the length function that attains Esn(R, ρ) in (7). As the length functions
are uniquely decipherable we have exp2{L∗n(i)} ≥ i.
Proposition 8 (Lower Bound): For a given ρ > 0 and rate R > 0, we have
Esl (R, ρ) ≥ max
{
ρR + lim inf
n→∞
1
n
lnF cXn ,
(1 + ρ) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈TR(Xn)
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n)
}
. (22)
Remark 3: The first term contains limit infimum of the error exponent for a rate-R source code. The
second exponent is the correct decoding exponent for a rate-R code when ρ ↓ 0.
9Proof: The variational formula (13) applied to the function U(xn) = ρmin{Ln(xn) ln 2, nR} gives
inf
Ln
lnEXn [exp {ρmin {Ln(X
n) ln 2, nR}}]
= inf
Ln
sup
PY n
{ρEY n [min{Ln(Y
n) ln 2, nR}]− d(Y n)}
≥ sup
PY n
{
ρ inf
Ln
EY n [min{Ln(X
n) ln 2, nR}]− d(Y n)
}
(23)
where the interchange of inf and sup yields the lower bound in (23). Fix a distribution PY n and consider
the first term in (23). Using the enumeration indicated above, we may write
inf
Ln
EY n [min{Ln(Y
n) ln 2, nR}]
=
|X|n∑
i=1
PY n(i)min{L
∗
n(i) ln 2, nR}
=
M∑
i=1
PY n(i)min{L
∗
n(i) ln 2, nR}+
|X|n∑
i=M+1
PY n(i)nR
≥
M∑
i=1
PY n(i) lnG
∗
n(i) + nRF
c
Y n (24)
≥ FY n
M∑
i=1
PY n(i)
FY n
LG∗n(i) ln 2− ln 2− ln(1 + n ln |X|)
+ nRF cY n (25)
≥ FY nH(P
′
Y n)− ln 2− ln(1 + n ln |X|) + nRF
c
Y n . (26)
Inequality (24) follows because
L∗n(i) ln 2 ≥ ln i = lnG
∗
n(i)
with G∗n the guessing strategy that guesses in decreasing order of PY n probabilities. LG∗n in (25) denotes
the length function given by Lemma 2. Inequality (26) follows from the source coding theorem’s lower
bound. Substitute (26) in (23), normalize by n, and take limit infimum to get
Esl (R, ρ)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
sup
PY n
{
ρFY nH(P
′
Y n) + F
c
Y nρnR − d(Y
n)
}
.
PY n may be thought of as a triplet made of P ′Y n , FY n , and the restriction of PY n to T cR(Y n). We now
perform the optimization
sup
PY n
{ρFY nH(P
′
Y n) + F
c
Y nρnR − d(Y
n)} (27)
in four steps.
Step 1: We first optimize over permutations of probabilities over strings. FY n , F cY n , H(PY n), and H(P ′Y n)
remain unchanged over these permutations. Observe that
−d(Y n) = H(PY n) +
∑
yn
PY n(y
n) lnPXn(y
n),
and so the maximum for −d(Y n) is attained when the permutation that orders PXn(·) in decreasing order
also orders PY n(·) in decreasing order. In particular, TR(Y n) equals TR(Xn).
10
Step 2: We now optimize over restriction of PY n to T cR(Y n). For a fixed FY n , the log-sum inequality
yields ∑
xn∈T c
R
(Xn)
PY n(x
n) ln
PY n(x
n)
PXn(xn)
≥ F cY n ln
F cY n
F cXn
,
with equality if and only if PY n(xn) = PXn(xn)
F c
Y n
F c
Xn
for all xn ∈ T cR(PXn).
Step 3: To optimize over P ′Y n rewrite (27) as
sup
PY n
{
ρFY nH(P
′
Y n) + F
c
Y nρnR
−
M∑
i=1
PY n(i) ln
PY n(i)
PXn(i)
−
|X|n∑
M+1
PY n(i) ln
PY n(i)
PXn(i)
}
= sup
P ′
Y n
,FY n
{
ρFY nH(P
′
Y n) + F
c
Y nρnR
−
M∑
i=1
PY n(i) ln
PY n(i)
PXn(i)
− F cY n ln
F cY n
F cXn
}
(28)
= sup
P ′
Y n
,FY n
{
ρFY nH(P
′
Y n) + F
c
Y nρnR
−FY nD(P
′
Y n ‖ P
′
Xn)−D(FY n||FXn)
}
(29)
= sup
FY n
{
ρFY nH 1
1+ρ
(P ′Xn) + F
c
Y nρnR
−D(FY n ‖ FXn)
}
. (30)
Equality (28) is obtained by substituting the attained lower bound in Step 2. In (29), P ′Y n and P ′Xn denote
conditional distributions of PY n and PXn given TR(Y n) and TR(Xn), respectively, where TR(Y n) =
TR(X
n) as argued in Step 1. D(FY n ||FXn) denotes the divergence between binary random variables
whose probabilities are {FY n , 1 − FY n} and {FXn , 1 − FXn} respectively. Finally we used variational
characterization of Re´nyi entropy given in (21) to arrive at (30).
Step 4: We now optimize over FY n ∈ [0, 1]. Let Z be a binary random variable defined as
Z =
{
ρH 1
1+ρ
(P ′Xn) with probability FY n ,
ρnR with probability 1− FY n
By EFY n [Z] we mean the expectation of Z with respect to the above distribution. Since Z is a positive
random variable, the variational formula yields
sup
FY n
{EFY n [Z]−D(FY n ‖ FXn)} = lnEFXn [exp{Z}] .
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Continuing with the chain of equalities from (30) we get
sup
FY n
{
FY nρH 1
1+ρ
(P ′Xn) + F
c
Y nρnR −D(FY n ‖ FXn)
}
= ln

F cXn exp{nRρ}+ FXn
(
M∑
i=1
P ′Xn
1
1+ρ (i)
)1+ρ

= ln

F cXn exp{nRρ}+
(
M∑
i=1
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (i)
)1+ρ
 . (31)
Finally normalize both sides of (31) by n, take limit infimum, and apply [11, Lemma 1.2.15], which states
that the exponential rate of a sum is governed by the maximum of the individual terms’ exponential rates,
to get the desired result.
In the subsequent subsections we further lower bound each of the two terms under max on the right-
hand side of (22). For an arbitrary source we first recall the source coding error exponent. We also identify
the growth rate of sum of exponentiated probabilities of the correct decoding set. We then relate these to
the terms in the lower bound obtained in (22). We largely follow the approach and notation of Iriyama
[6], which we now describe.
Given X = (PXn : n ∈ N) and Y = (PY n : n ∈ N), we define the upper divergence Du(· ‖ ·) and lower
divergence Dl(· ‖ ·) by
Du(Y ‖ X) := lim sup
n→∞
1
n
D(PY n ‖ PXn)
Dl(Y ‖ X) := lim inf
n→∞
1
n
D(PY n ‖ PXn).
For a Y = (PY n : n ∈ N), denote the spectral sup-entropy-rate [5, Sec. II], [12] as
H(Y) := inf
{
θ : lim
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
ln
1
PY n(Y n)
> θ
}
= 0
}
,
and the spectral inf-entropy-rate as
H(Y) := sup
{
θ : lim
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
ln
1
PY n(Y n)
< θ
}
= 0
}
.
Also define, as in [6, Sec. II], the following quantity which determines the performance under mismatched
compression:
R(Y,X) := sup
{
θ :lim
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
ln
1
PXn(Y n)
< θ
}
=0
}
.
1) Decoding Error Exponent: In this subsection we recall the decoding error exponent for fixed-rate
encoding of an arbitrary source. We identify the first term in (22) as composed of the exponent of minimum
probability of decoding error, and obtain a lower bound for it, or alternatively an upper bound on the
error exponent. This is made precise in the following definitions.
By an (n,Mn, ǫn)-code we mean an encoding mapping
φn : X
n → {1, 2, · · · ,Mn}
and a decoding mapping
ψn : {1, 2, · · ·Mn} → X
n
12
with probability of error ǫn := Pr{ψn(φn(Xn)) 6= Xn}. R is r-achievable if for all η > 0 there exists a
sequence of (n,Mn, ǫn)-codes such that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
ln
1
ǫn
≥ r (32)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
lnMn ≤ R + η. (33)
The infimum fixed-length coding rate for exponent r is
Rˆ(r|X) = inf{R : R is r-achievable}.
On the other hand, the supremum fixed-length coding exponent for rate R is
Eˆ(R|X) = sup{r : R is r-achievable}.
See Iriyama [6] and Han [12, Sec. 1.9] for a pessimistic definition for fixed rate source coding, i.e., the
liminf in place of limsup in (32). See also Iriyama & Ihara [13] for both the pessimistic and optimistic
definitions. These works obtained bounds on the infimum coding rate. In particular, Iriyama [6, Eqn. (13)],
Iriyama & Ihara [13, Eqn. (12)] obtained lower bounds on the infimum coding rate Rˆ(r|X) under the
optimistic definition, the definition of interest to us. We however work with the error exponent, and obtain
an upper bound on supremum coding exponent. This suffices to lower bound the first term in (22).
Clearly, Mn = ⌊exp{nR}⌋ satisfies (33), and with
r0 = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
1
F cXn
,
R is r0-achievable. It follows from the definition of Eˆ(R|X) that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
ln
1
F cXn
≤ Eˆ(R|X)
so that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
lnF cXn ≥ −Eˆ(R|X).
The following proposition upper bounds the supremum coding exponent.
Proposition 9: For any rate R > 0,
Eˆ(R|X) ≤ inf
Y:H(Y)>R
Du(Y ‖ X). (34)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 4: When R ≥ ln |X|, the probability of decoding error ǫn = 0, so that Eˆ(R|X) = +∞. The
right-hand side is an infimum over an empty set and is +∞ by convention, and the proposition holds for
such R as well.
One can also show the alternative bound
Eˆ(R|X) ≤ inf
Y:R(Y,X)−Du(Y‖X)>R
Du(Y ‖ X). (35)
See the end of Appendix C on how to prove this. This result would be the functional inverse of Iriyama’s [6,
Eqn. (13)], while Proposition 9 is the functional inverse of Iriyama & Ihara’s [13, Eqn. (12)]. Proposition
9, as we will soon see, provides a more natural extension of Arikan & Merhav’s expression for E(R, ρ)
to general sources.
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2) Correct Decoding Exponent: We now study a generalization of the exponential rate for probability
of correct decoding.
For a given (n,Mn, ǫn)-code, let
An := {x
n ∈ Xn : ψn(φn(x
n)) = xn}
denote the set of correctly decoded sequences. For a given ρ > 0, R is (r, ρ)-admissible if for every η > 0
there exists a sequence of (n,Mn, ǫn)-codes such that
(1 + ρ) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈An
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n) ≥ r (36)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
lnMn ≤ R + η. (37)
Unlike the exponent for the probability of error, here r can be positive or negative. The infimum fixed-length
admissible rate for a given r and ρ > 0 is
R∗(r, ρ|X) = inf{R : R is (r, ρ)-admissible}.
It is easy to see that the set {R : R is (r, ρ)-admissible} is closed and so R∗(r, ρ|X) is (r, ρ)-admissible.
The supremum fixed-length coding exponent for a given R and ρ is
E∗(R, ρ|X) = sup{r : R is (r, ρ)-admissible}.
Remark 5: The choice of limit infimum in (36) makes the definition of admissibility pessimistic. For
ρ ↓ 0, the above definitions reduce to the special case of exponential rate for probability of correct
decoding (see [12, Sec. 1.10]).
Clearly, An should be TR(Xn) to maximize the left-hand side of (36), and hence
E∗(R, ρ|X) = (1 + ρ) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈TR(Xn)
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n).
The following proposition gives an expression for E∗(R, ρ|X) and generalizes [6, Thm. 4] to any arbitrary
ρ > 0. En route to its derivation we find the expression for R∗(r, ρ|X).
Proposition 10: For any ρ > 0, we have
R∗(r, ρ|X) = inf
Y:El(Y,X,ρ)≥r
H(Y) (38)
E∗(R, ρ|X) = sup
Y:H(Y)≤R
El(Y,X, ρ). (39)
Proof: See Appendix D.
C. Summary of Bounds on Esu and Esl
We now combine Propositions 7-10 of the previous subsections to obtain the main result of the paper.
Theorem 11: For a given ρ > 0 and R > 0,
max
{
ρR − inf
Y:H(Y)>R
Du(Y ‖ X),
sup
Y:H(Y)≤R
El(Y,X, ρ)
}
≤ Esl (R, ρ) ≤ E
s
u(R, ρ)
≤ min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)R +max
Y
Eu(Y,X, θ)
}
. (40)
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Proof: The last inequality was proved in Proposition 7. Proposition 8 indicates that
Esl (R, ρ)
≥ max
{
ρR + lim inf
n→∞
1
n
lnF cXn ,
(1 + ρ) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈TR(Xn)
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n)
}
≥ max
{
ρR− Eˆ(R|X), E∗(R, ρ|X)
}
(41)
≥ max
{
ρR− inf
Y:H(Y)>R
Du(Y ‖ X),
sup
Y:H(Y)≤R
El(Y,X, ρ)
}
, (42)
where (41) follows from the lower bound on Eˆ(R|X) and the definition of E∗(R, ρ|X), and (42) from
Propositions 9 and 10.
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section we evaluate the bounds for some examples where they are tight, and recover some known
results.
Example 1 (Perfect Secrecy): First consider the perfect secrecy case, for example, R ≥ ln |X|. Because
of Remark 4 and because we may take θ = ρ in the upper bound in (40), the limiting exponential rate of
guessing moments simplifies to
sup
Y
El(Y,X, ρ) ≤ E
s
l (R, ρ)
≤ Esu(R, ρ) ≤ max
Y
Eu(Y,X, ρ).
On account of (11) in Proposition 6, sup in the left-most term is achieved. From Proposition 6, upper and
lower bounds are ρ times the liminf and limsup Re´nyi entropy rates of order 1
1+ρ
. In a related work we
proved in [8, Prop. 7] that whenever the information spectrum of the source satisfies the large deviation
property with rate function I , the Re´nyi entropy rate converges and limiting guessing exponent equals the
Legendre-Fenchel dual of the scaled rate function I1(t) := (1 + ρ)I(t), i.e.,
Esu(R, ρ) = E
s
l (R, ρ) = sup
t∈R
{ρt− I1(t)}.
In the next examples, we consider the case R < ln |X|.
Example 2 (An iid source): This example was first studied by Merhav & Arikan [2]. Recall that an
iid source is one for which Pn(xn) =
∏n
i=1 P1(xi), where P1 denotes the marginal of X1. We will now
evaluate each term in (40).
We first argue that
inf
Y:H(Y)>R
Du(Y ‖ X) = inf
PY :H(PY )>R
D(PY ‖ P1). (43)
To prove that the left-hand side in (43) is less than or equal to the right-hand side, let PY ∈ M(X) be
such that H(PY ) > R. Construct an iid source Yˆ = (PYˆ n : n ∈ N) such that PYˆi = PY for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The iid property easily implies that
Du(Yˆ ‖ X) = D(PY ‖ P1),
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and the law of large numbers for iid random variables yields
H(Yˆ) = H(PY ) > R. (44)
From (44), we have that the infimum on the left-hand side of (43) is over a larger set. We can therefore
conclude that “≤” holds in (43).
To prove “≥” in (43) we use the result (see [12, Th. 1.7.2])
H(Y) ≤ Hl(Y) := lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(PY n)
to get that the infimum over a larger set is smaller, i.e.,
inf
Y:H(Y)>R
Du(Y ‖ X) ≥ inf
Y:Hl(Y)>R
Du(Y ‖ X). (45)
Because of (45) it is sufficient to prove
inf
Y:Hl(Y)>R
Du(Y ‖ X) ≥ inf
PY :H(PY )>R
D(PY ‖ P1). (46)
Let Y be such that Hl(Y) > R. Construct a source Yˆ such that, PYˆi = PYi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
Yˆ1, Yˆ2, · · · , Yˆn are independent. Let Z be another source such that Z1, Z2, · · · , Zn is an iid sequence with
distribution
PZj =
1
n
n∑
i=1
PYi , j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
As the marginals of Y n and Yˆ n with independent components are the same, it easily follows from the
formula for Kullback-Leibler divergence that
D(PY n ‖ PXn) = D(PY n ‖ PYˆ n) +D(PYˆ n ‖ PXn)
≥ D(PYˆ n ‖ PXn)
=
n∑
i=1
D(PYˆi ‖ P1)
≥ nD(PZ1 ‖ P1), (47)
where (47) follows from the convexity of divergence. From the concavity of Shannon entropy, we also
have
H(PY n) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(PYi) ≤ nH(PZ1). (48)
Normalize by n take limsup in (47) and liminf in (48) to get Du(Y ‖ X) ≥ D(PZ1 ‖ P1) and H(PZ1) > R
for a PZ1 that is a limit point of the sequence (n−1
∑n
i=1 PYi, n ∈ N). From these we conclude that (46)
holds. This proves (43).
Following a similar procedure as above, we can bound the other terms in (40) for an iid source as
sup
Y:H(Y)≤R
El(Y,X, ρ)
≥ sup
PY :H(PY )≤R
{ρH(PY )−D(PY ‖ P1)} (49)
and
sup
Y
Eu(Y,X, θ) = sup
PY
{θH(PY )−D(PY ‖ P1)}. (50)
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Substitution of (43) and (49) in the lower bound of (40) yields
Esl (R, ρ) ≥ max
{
ρR− inf
PY :H(PY )>R
D(PY ‖ P1),
sup
PY :H(PY )≤R
{ρH(PY )−D(PY ‖ P1)}
}
= sup
PY
{ρmin{H(PY ), R} −D(PY ‖ P1)} . (51)
Similarly substitution of (50) in the upper bound of (40) yields
Esu(R, ρ)
≤ min
0≤θ≤ρ
{
(ρ− θ)R + sup
PY
{θH(PY )−D(PY ‖ P1)}
}
= sup
PY
{
min
0≤θ≤ρ
{(ρ− θ)R + θH(PY )} −D(PY ‖ P1)
}
(52)
= sup
PY
{ρmin{H(PY ), R} −D(PY ‖ P1)} , (53)
where the interchange of sup and min in (52) holds because the function within braces is linear in θ and
concave in PY . From (51) and (53), we recover Merhav & Arikan’s result (1) for an iid source [2, Eqn.
(3)].
Example 3 (Markov source): In this example we focus on an irreducible stationary Markov source
taking values on X and having a transition probability matrix π.
Let Ms(X2) denote the set of stationary PMFs defined by
Ms
(
X
2
)
=
{
Q ∈ M
(
X
2
)
:∑
x1∈X
Q(x1, x) =
∑
x2∈X
Q(x, x2), ∀x ∈ X
}
.
Denote the common marginal by q and let
η(· | x1) :=
{
Q(x1, ·)/q(x1), if q(x1) 6= 0,
1/|X|, otherwise.
We may then denote Q = q × η, where q is the distribution of X1 and η the conditional distribution of
X2 given X1. Following steps similar to the iid case, we have
Esu = E
s
l = sup
Q∈Ms(X2)
{
ρmin{H(η | q), R} −D(η ‖ π | q)
}
,
where
H(η | q) :=
∑
x∈X
q(x)H(η(· | x)).
is the conditional one-step entropy, and
D(η ‖ π | q) =
∑
x1∈X
q(x1)D(η(· | x1) ‖ π(· | x1)).
For a unifilar source the underlying state space forms a Markov chain and the entropy and divergence of
the source equals those of the underlying Markov state space source [14, Thm. 6.4.2]. The arguments for
the Markov source are now directly applicable to a unifilar source.
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V. CONCLUSION
We saw the close connection between the problem of guessing a source realization given a cryptogram
and the problem of compression with saturated exponential costs. The latter is a modification of a problem
posed by Campbell [7]. Moreover, the exponents for both these problems coincide. This exponent is
determined by the error exponent and a generalization of correct decoding exponent for fixed length
block source codes.
We end this paper with some open questions.
• The equivalence between guessing and compression exploits the finite alphabet size assumption. Can
this be relaxed?
• How do the results of this paper extend to the case with receiver side information? Can the result of
Hayashi & Yamamoto be extended to general sources?
• If guessing to within a distortion is allowed, can the result of Merhav & Arikan [15] be extended to
general sources? Both cases of perfect secrecy and key-rate constrained secrecy remain open.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Let Pn be any PMF on Xn. Enumerate the elements of Xn from 1 to |X|n in the decreasing order of
their Pn-probabilities. Let M = exp{nR} denote the number of distinct key strings. For convenience, we
shall assume that M is a power of 2 so that the number of key bits k = nR/(ln 2) is an integer. The
general case will be easily handled towards the end of this section.
If M does not divide |X|n, append a few dummy messages of zero probability to make the number of
messages N a multiple of M . Further, index the messages from 0 to N − 1. Henceforth, we identify a
message xn by its index.
Divide the messages into groups of M so that message m belongs to group Tj , where j = ⌊m/M⌋,
and ⌊·⌋ is the floor function. Enumerate the key streams from 0 to M − 1, so that 0 ≤ u ≤ M − 1. The
function fn is now defined as follows. For m = jM + i set
fn(jM + i, u)
∆
= jM + (i⊕ u) ,
where i⊕ u is the bit-wise XOR operation. Thus messages in group Tj are encrypted to messages in the
same group. The index i identifying the specific message in group Tj , i.e., the last k = nR/(ln 2) bits of
m, are encrypted via bit-wise XOR with the key stream. Given u and the cryptogram, decryption is clear
– perform bit-wise XOR with u on the last nR/(ln 2) bits of y.
Given a cryptogram y, the only information that the attacker gleans is that the message belongs to the
group determined by y. Indeed, if y ∈ Tj , then
Pn {Y = y} =
1
M
Pn {X
n ∈ Tj} ,
and therefore
Pn {X
n = m | Y = y} =
{
Pn{Xn=m}
Pn{Xn∈Tj}
, ⌊m/M⌋ = j,
0, otherwise,
which decreases with m for m ∈ Tj , because of our enumeration in the decreasing order of probabilities,
and is 0 for m /∈ Tj . The attacker’s best strategy Gfn(· | y) is therefore to restrict his guesses to Tj and
guess in the order jM, jM + 1, · · · , jM +M − 1. Thus, when xn = jM + i, the optimal attack strategy
requires i+ 1 guesses.
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We now analyze the performance of this attack strategy as follows.
E [Gfn(X
n|Y )ρ]
=
N/M−1∑
j=0
M−1∑
i=0
Pn{X
n = jM + i}(i+ 1)ρ
≥
N/M−1∑
j=0
M−1∑
i=0
Pn{X
n = (j + 1)M − 1}(i+ 1)ρ (54)
≥
N/M−1∑
j=0
Pn{X
n = (j + 1)M − 1}
M1+ρ
1 + ρ
(55)
≥
1
1 + ρ
N/M−1∑
j=0
M−1∑
i=0
Pn{X
n = (j + 1)M + i}Mρ
(56)
=
1
1 + ρ
N−1∑
m=M
Pn{X
n = m}Mρ (57)
where (54) follows because the arrangement in the decreasing order of probabilities implies that
Pn{X
n = jM + i} ≥ Pn{X
n = (j + 1)M − 1}
for i = 0, · · · ,M − 1. Inequality (55) follows because
M−1∑
i=0
(i+ 1)ρ =
M∑
i=1
iρ ≥
∫ M
0
zρ dz =
M1+ρ
1 + ρ
.
Inequality (56) follows because the decreasing probability arrangement implies
Pn{X
n = (j + 1)M − 1} ≥
1
M
M−1∑
i=0
Pn{X
n = (j + 1)M + i}.
Inequality (57) follows because we take Pn(Xn = m) = 0 for all the further dummy messages with
indices m > N . Thus (57) implies that
N−1∑
m=0
Pn{X
n = m} (min{m+ 1,M})ρ
=
M−1∑
m=0
Pn{X
n = m}(m+ 1)ρ +
N−1∑
m=M
Pn{X
n = m}Mρ
≤ E [Gfn(X
n|Y )ρ] + (1 + ρ)E [Gfn(X
n|Y )ρ]
= (2 + ρ)E [Gfn(X
n|Y )ρ] . (58)
Let G be the guessing function that guesses in the decreasing order of Pn-probabilities without regard to
Y , i.e., G(m) = m+ 1. Let LG be the associated length function, given in Lemma 2. Now use (58) and
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Lemma 2 to get
E [Gfn(X
n|Y )ρ]
≥
1
2 + ρ
E [(min {G(Xn),M})ρ]
≥
1
2 + ρ
E
[(
min
{
exp2{LG(X
n)}
2cn
,M
})ρ]
≥
1
(2cn)ρ(2 + ρ)
E [exp {ρmin {LG(X
n) ln 2, nR}}] ,
(59)
where the last inequality follows by pulling out 2cn and recognizing that 2cnM ≥M ≥ exp{nR}. Since
Gfn is the strategy that minimizes E [G(Xn | Y )ρ] , the proof is complete for the cases when k = nR/(ln 2)
is an integer.
When nR/(ln 2) is not an integer, choose k = ⌈nR/(ln 2)⌉. Then M = exp2{k} ≥ exp{nR}, and it
immediately follows that inequality (59) continues to hold. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
We begin with the following lemma. Recall that M(X) is the set of all probability measures on X and
M(B) the subset of M(X) with support set B ⊆ X:
M(B) = {ν ∈M(X) : ν(B) = 1}.
Lemma 12: For any ρ > 0, µ ∈M(X) and B ⊆ X
(1 + ρ) ln
∑
x∈B
µ
1
1+ρ (x) = max
ν∈M(B)
{ρH(ν)−D(ν ‖ µ)}.
Remark 6: [6, Lemma 1] is the special case when ρ = 0.
Proof: Let µB(x) = µ(x)µ(B)1{x ∈ B}. We then have
(1 + ρ) ln
∑
x∈B
µ
1
1+ρ (x)
= (1 + ρ) ln
∑
x∈B
µB
1
1+ρ (x) + lnµ(B)
= (1 + ρ) max
ν∈M(B)
{∑
x∈B
ρ
1 + ρ
ν(x) ln
1
µB(x)
−D(ν ‖ µB)
}
+ lnµ(B) (60)
= (1 + ρ) max
ν∈M(B)
{
ρ
1 + ρ
{H(ν) +D(ν ‖ µ)}
−D(ν ‖ µ)
}
(61)
= max
ν∈M(B)
{ρH(ν)−D(ν ‖ µ)} . (62)
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where (60) follows from the variational formula for Re´nyi entropy of µB. The maximum achieving
distribution in (62) is µ∗ ∈M(B) given by
µ∗(x) =
µ
1
1+ρ (x)∑
y∈B µ
1
1+ρ (y)
1{x ∈ B},
a fact that is easily verified via direct substitution.
We now prove (11); proof of (10) is similar and therefore omitted. We begin by showing “≤” in
(11). Let X∗ = (P ∗Xn : n ∈ N) ∈ M(B) be as defined in (12). It is straightforward to verify by direct
substitution that
(1 + ρ) ln
∑
xn∈Bn
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n) = ρH(P ∗Xn)−D(P
∗
Xn ‖ PXn).
Normalize by n and take limit infimum, and use the definition of El(X∗,X, ρ) to get
(1 + ρ) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈Bn
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n)
= El(X
∗,X, ρ) (63)
≤ max
Y∈M(B)
El(Y,X, ρ).
To prove “≥” in (11), let Y = (PY n : n ∈ N) ∈ M(B) be an arbitrary sequence. We may assume
that for all sufficiently large n, PY n ≪ PXn holds; otherwise El(Y,X, ρ) = −∞ and the inequality “≥”
holds automatically. Define Y∗ = (P ∗Y n : n ∈ N) ∈M(B) by
P ∗Y n(y
n) =
PY n(y
n)
PY n(Bn)
1{yn ∈ Bn}.
It is clear that P ∗Y n ∈M(Bn) for every n. From Lemma 12, we have
(1 + ρ) ln
∑
xn∈Bn
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n)
= max
PY n∈M(Bn)
{ρH(PY n)−D(PY n ‖ PXn)}
≥ ρH(P ∗Y n)−D(P
∗
Y n ‖ PXn). (64)
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We now study each term on the right-hand side of (64). The entropy term is lower bounded as follows:
ρH(P ∗Y n)
=
ρ
PY n(Bn)
{ ∑
xn∈Bn
PY n(x
n) ln
1
PY n(xn)
}
+ ρ lnPY n(Bn)
=
ρ
PY n(Bn)

H(PY n)−
∑
xn∈Bcn
PY n(x
n) ln
1
PY n(xn)


+ ρ lnPY n(Bn)
=
ρ
PY n(Bn)
{
H(PY n)− PY n(B
c
n)H(PY n |B
c
n)
+ PY n(B
c
n) lnPY n(B
c
n)
}
+ ρ lnPY n(Bn)
≥
ρ
PY n(Bn)
{
H(PY n)− PY n(B
c
n)n ln |X|
+ PY n(B
c
n) lnPY n(B
c
n)
}
+ ρ lnPY n(Bn).
(65)
The divergence term is upper bounded, as in the proof of Iriyama’s [6, Prop. 1], as follows:
D(P ∗Y n ‖ PXn)
= − lnPY n(Bn)
+
1
PY n(Bn)
∑
xn∈Bn
PY n(x
n) ln
PY n(x
n)
PXn(xn)
= − lnPY n(Bn) +
1
PY n(Bn)
D(PY n ‖ PXn)
−
1
PY n(Bn)
∑
xn∈Bcn
PY n(x
n) ln
PY n(x
n)
PXn(xn)
≤ − lnPY n(Bn) +
1
PY n(Bn)
D(PY n ‖ PXn)
−
PY n(B
c
n)− PXn(B
c
n)
PY n(Bn)
(66)
≤ − lnPY n(Bn) +
1
PY n(Bn)
D(PY n ‖ PXn)
+
1
PY n(Bn)
. (67)
To get (66), we used the fact that lnx ≥ 1− 1
x
for all x > 0 and in inequality (67) we used the relation
PY n(B
c
n)− PXn(B
c
n) ≥ −1.
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Substitution of (65) and (67) in (64) and the fact that limn→∞ PY n(Bn) = 1 yield
(1 + ρ) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈Bn
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
{ρH(PY n)−D(PY n ‖ PXn)−O(1)}
= El(Y,X, ρ).
Since the choice of Y = (PY n : n ∈ N) ∈M(B) was arbitrary, we have proved “≥” in (11).
From (63) and (11), the maximum is attained by X∗, the distribution defined in (12). This completes
the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
Iriyama & Ihara showed the following lower bound on the infimum coding rate ([13, Th.3, Eqn. (12)]):
sup
Y:Du(Y‖X)<r
H(Y) ≤ Rˆ(r|X). (68)
We claim that (68) is equivalent to (34). This proves the proposition.
We first show that (68) implies (34). Fix the source X. Let R be a given rate. Consider an arbitrary
candidate exponent r and an arbitrary source Y. We argue that
R is r-achievable and H(Y) > R =⇒ r ≤ Du(Y ‖ X). (69)
Taking the infimum on the right-hand side of (69) over Y with H(Y) > R, and then the supremum over
r will yield (34).
To argue (69) by contraposition, we shall show that
r > Du(Y ‖ X)
=⇒ either R is not r-achievable or H(Y) ≤ R,
or equivalently, we shall show that
r > Du(Y ‖ X) and H(Y) > R
=⇒ R is not r-achievable.
But the conditions on the left-hand side imply
sup
Y:Du(Y‖X)<r
H(Y) > R,
which together with (68) yields Rˆ(r|X) > R, and this is the same as saying R is not r-achievable. This
completes the proof of (68) ⇒ (34). (This direction suffices to prove Proposition 9). The proof of the
other direction is analogous.
To prove the upper bound in (35), we begin with Iriyama’s [6, Eqn. (13)], which is
sup
Y:Du(Y‖X)<r
{R(Y,X)−Du(Y ‖ X)} ≤ Rˆ(r|X),
instead of (68). The rest of the proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 9.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10
We use the following notations in this proof. For each B = (Bn : n ∈ N) define
|B| := lim sup
n→∞
1
n
ln |Bn|
and
S(Y) :=
{
B : lim
n→∞
PY n(Bn) = 1
}
.
Note that B ∈ S(Y)⇔ Y ∈ M(B). We will first prove (38). Define a set
B(r, ρ|X) =
{
B := (Bn : n ∈ N) :
(1 + ρ) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈Bn
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n) ≥ r
}
. (70)
Then, by definition,
R∗(r, ρ|X) = inf {|B| : B ∈ B(r, ρ|X)} . (71)
Fix a B ∈ B(r, ρ|X). Proposition 6 then implies
(1 + ρ) lim inf
n→∞
1
n
ln
∑
xn∈Bn
P
1
1+ρ
Xn (x
n)
= max
Y:B∈S(Y)
El(Y,X, ρ).
We can therefore conclude using (70) that the following set equivalence holds:
B(r, ρ|X) =
⋃
El(Y,X,ρ)≥r
S(Y). (72)
From (71) and (72) we get
R∗(r, ρ|X) = inf

|B| : B ∈
⋃
El(Y,X,ρ)≥r
S(Y)


= inf
Y
{|B| : El(Y,X, ρ) ≥ r,B ∈ S(Y)}
= inf
Y:El(Y,X,ρ)≥r
H(Y),
where last equality follows because
H(Y) = inf {|B| : B ∈ S(Y)}
as proved by Han & Verdu´ [16]. This proves (38).
We now prove (39). We first show that if R is (r, ρ)-admissible then r ≤ supH(Y)≤R El(Y,X, ρ).
Since R is (r, ρ)-admissible, definition of R∗(r, ρ|X) and (38) imply
R ≥ R∗(r, ρ|X) = inf
Y:El(Y,X,ρ)≥r
H(Y),
i.e., for all δ > 0 there exists a Yˆ such that
El(Yˆ,X, ρ) ≥ r and H(Yˆ) < R + δ,
24
which further implies that
r ≤ sup
H(Y)<R+δ
El(Y,X, ρ).
Since δ was arbitrary, letting δ ↓ 0 yields
r ≤ sup
H(Y)≤R
El(Y,X, ρ),
and the converse part is proved.
For the direct part it is sufficient to show that given ρ, any R with
r := sup
H(Y)≤R
El(Y,X, ρ),
is (r, ρ)-admissible. By choice of r, for all δ > 0, there exists a Yˆ such that
El(Yˆ,X, ρ) > r − δ and H(Yˆ) ≤ R.
This implies that
inf
El(Y,X,ρ)>r−δ
H(Y) ≤ R.
Since δ was arbitrary, let δ ↓ 0 and use (38) to get
R ≥ inf
El(Y,X,ρ)≥r
H(Y) = R∗(r, ρ|X),
i.e., is (r, ρ)-admissible. This completes the proof.
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